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Lies, Damn Lies, and Batson Challenges: 
The Right to Use Statistical Evidence to 
Prove Racial Bias 
Graham R. Cronogue* 
This Article provides two principal contributions to the study of 
wrongful convictions. First, it fills a gap in the literature by 
clarifying the scope of a capital defendant’s constitutional right 
to use statistics when attacking a wrongful conviction caused by 
racial bias in jury selection. In doing so, the Article not only 
examines the content of the Court’s jurisprudence but it also 
explores the historical “arc” toward greater evidentiary 
protections. This arc has been guided primarily by the 
realization that prior narrower solutions have been ineffective at 
combating racially-motivated peremptory strikes. The Article 
will also place modern statistical evidence in its proper place on 
that arc by discussing the relevance and unique value of 
statistics in illuminating patterns and bias.1 Second, it examines 
the comparative merits of conferring these wrongful conviction 
protections through statute or confirming them through 
constitutional litigation. In light of the severe backlash against 
North Carolina’s statute, this Article advocates the, perhaps 
more lasting and less politically dependent, approach of 
constitutional litigation. 
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1 Especially in the peremptory strike context where bias is otherwise very difficult to 
prove. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the many significant advances in the field of equal 
protection, the American criminal justice system remains haunted by its 
legacy of racial discrimination. Formal and overt tactics of racial 
discrimination have been effectively stamped out.2 However, less overt 
tactics still slip by undetected, and the specter of slavery and Jim Crow 
continues to cast a shadow over the legitimacy of the legal process.3 As a 
result of these hidden tactics, minority defendants still face the danger 
that they will be wrongfully convicted because of their race;4 courts still 
run the risk that the sentences they impose will be tainted by racial bias;5 
                                                                                                             
2 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding that 
segregation of 
children in public schools is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
3 Discrimination within the judicial system is most pernicious because it is “a 
stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to [black citizens] 
that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.” Strauder v. West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1986). See also 
SAMUEL GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN 
CAPITAL SENTENCING xiii (1989) (“The Supreme Court has more or less acknowledged 
that race continues to play a major role in capital sentencing in America . . . But the Court 
has decided to do nothing about [discrepancies in the imposition of capital punishment] 
and refuses to hear future claims based on it.”). 
4 See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson et. al., Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit 
Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 
563–65 (2014) (finding evidence of implicit racial bias in a juror’s perception of a 
criminal defendant’s capital case). 
5 See e.g., Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in 
Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of 
Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2010) (discussing the 
role that a trial judge’s implicit bias may play in jury selection). 
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and our society must still struggle with the fact that the promise of equal 
protection remains an aspiration and not a reality for so many Americans. 
This Article addresses one of the most subtle, yet effective, forms of 
discrimination that continues to burden the criminal justice system: 
racially biased peremptory strikes. In recent years, these strikes have 
garnered considerable attention from courts, state legislatures, and the 
media; however, they remain a significant obstacle to the fair, impartial 
administration of justice.6 
By their very nature, peremptory strikes are difficult to police. A 
peremptory strike may be used for any reason against a juror as long as 
the attorney demonstrates a plausible, non-discriminatory reason for 
striking the juror from the pool.7 Therefore, while a prosecutor may have 
removed a juror because he is black, he can avoid detection by putting 
forward a different reason for the strike.8 In a legal environment where 
such vague explanations as a juror’s “casual” demeanor9 are plausible, 
non-racial reasons, it is very difficult for the defendant to prove that race 
was the actual reason for any specific strike.10 Since peremptory strikes 
remain a uniquely attractive option for a lawyer hoping to exclude 
minority jurors,11 it is perhaps not surprising that race continues to play a 
non-trivial role in jury selection in many states and prosecutorial 
districts.12 
                                                                                                             
6 Edward Pilkington, Missouri Pressured to Halt Execution of Black Man Sentenced 
By All-White Jury, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2015, 3:07 P.M.), 
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/13/missouri-governor-pressured-
execution-andre-cole-white-jury. 
7 In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), the Supreme Court held that 
the Equal Protection Clause also prohibits the discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges based solely on gender; however, this Article will focus exclusively on the 
racial component of peremptory strikes. 
8 Id. 
9 For examples of vague reasons accepted by the courts as valid bases for peremptory 
strikes, see, e.g., People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (Ind. 1989) (casual manner); 
United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010–11 (5th Cir. 1987) (“posture and 
demeanor”); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir.1987) (“poor 
attitude”); United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1070–71 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(“avoidance of eye contact”). 
10 Such a task is even more difficult on appeal as the panel would not have had the 
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the juror in question. 
11 Barbara O’Brien and Catherine M. Gosso, Report on Jury Selection Study, 
MICHIGAN STATE UNIV. COLLEGE OF LAW (Dec. 15, 2011), http://digitalcommons.law. 
msu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1330&context=facpubs at 11(finding a “statistically 
significant disparity” between prospective black jurors and prospective white jurors in 
North Carolina). 
12 Id. 
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Though subtle, the damage caused by a racially biased peremptory 
strike should not be understated.13 It deprives a defendant of the most 
basic protection in our criminal justice system—the right to an impartial 
jury that has been indifferently chosen with respect to race. At the same 
time, it puts a prosecutor in a disproportionately powerful position to 
control the racial makeup of a jury, allowing him to play on racial biases 
and a lack of cross-racial understanding. As empirical studies have 
shown, juries from which minorities have been intentionally excluded are 
significantly more likely to convict African Americans.14 This problem is 
especially disconcerting in the capital punishment context, where a 
wrongful conviction carries with it extreme and irreparable harm.15 Such 
results profoundly undermine the legitimacy of our courts and the 
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In an attempt to remedy this problem, some southern states have 
taken—or considered taking—action by conferring upon each capital 
defendant a statutory right to use statistical evidence of racial bias.16 The 
underlying goals of these attempts—fair and just trials, the minimization 
of false convictions, and greater equality in sentencing and punishment—
cannot be legitimately challenged.17 However, the method by which 
these rights are secured—statistical evidence from a large group of 
cases—has been vehemently opposed. 
North Carolina’s initial triumph and eventual failure in this matter is 
especially instructive. In 2012, the North Carolina legislature attempted 
                                                                                                             
13 Id.; see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991)(“[R]acial discrimination in 
the qualification or selection of jurors on account of race, ethnicity, or gender ‘offends 
the dignity of persons and the integrity of the courts.”). 
14 See generally Levinson, supra note 4 (finding evidence of implicit racial bias in a 
juror’s perception criminal defendant’s case); see also Patrick Bayer, et al., The Impact of 
Jury Race in Criminal Trials, DUKE POP. RESEARCH INST. (June 2011) (analyzing the 
effect of different racial compositions of jury on criminal verdict). 
15 Clearly, a racially biased peremptory strike also deprives a prospective juror of his 
right to serve on a jury on account of his race or ethnicity, a separate (but still severe) 
constitutional violation. See e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975). 
16 For more information about North Carolina’s Racial Justice Act, see Kim Severson, 
North Carolina Repeals Law Allowing Racial Bias Claim in Death Penalty Challenges, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/us/racial-justice-act-
repealed-in-north-carolina.html?_r=0. For a discussion of efforts in Texas, see Scott 
Goldstein, Dallas DA Craig Watkins to Push for Law Allowing Appeals Based on Racial 
Factors, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Jan. 22, 2013), http:// www.dallasnews.com/news/ 
community-news/dallas/headlines/20130121-dallas-da-craig-watkins-to-push-for-law-
allowing-appeals-based-on-racial-factors.ece. 
17 The Supreme Court has consistently held that procedural safeguards should prevent 
the arbitrary enforcement of the death penalty. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 240 
(1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
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to right some of its past wrongs18 by implementing the “Racial Justice 
Act,” which afforded a defendant the right to use statistical evidence to 
show racially biased peremptory strikes in his state, county, or district.19 
Instead of being embraced as a creative solution to a seemingly 
insurmountable problem, the RJA ignited a firestorm of controversy.20 
According to the opponents of the RJA, the statute’s approval of 
statistical evidence from similar cases is improper. That is, a defendant 
should only be able to use evidence of jury selection tactics that he can 
directly prove occurred during his trial; he should not be able to use 
statistical evidence of strikes from other cases to prove bias in his case.21 
The debates surrounding the wisdom of this statutory provision seem 
to suggest that a defendant’s right to use statistics from other cases to 
demonstrate racial bias derives only from statute; he has no constitutional 
right to use such evidence.22 The subsequent repeal, which specifically 
attacked the statistical evidence provision, confirms that the legislature 
                                                                                                             
18 See, e.g., Michal Biesecker, Racial Justice Act Repeal Hits a Roadblock, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (June 6, 2011), http://www.pfadp.org/pfadp-news-othermenu-71/492-racial-
justice-act-repeal-hits-a-roadblock (quoting Rep. Paul Luebke “[u]ntil 1965, racial 
discrimination was legal in this state. Racial discrimination is part of our history, part of 
our heritage. It is wrong to pretend that racial discrimination does not still exists in this 
state.”); THE TRIALS OF DARRYL HUNT, (BREAK THRU FILMS 2006) (available on HBO) 
(Darryl Hunt, a black man in North Carolina, was wrongfully sentenced to life in prison 
based on an eyewitness identification from a former Klu Klux Klan member. The 
conviction was believed to be racially motivated); William J. Barber II, Voices: Ending 
Racial Injustice and Prosecutorial Misconduct, THE INSTITUTE FOR SOUTHERN STUDIES 
(July 2007), http://www.southernstudies.org/2009/07/post-44.html; ACLU, Innocent 
North Carolina Man Exonerated After 14 Years On Death Row (May 2, 2008) (Levon 
“Bo” Jones, an African–American who was wrongfully convicted and spent 13 years on 
death row because of false testimony). 
19 Barbara O’Brien & Catherine M. Grosso, Confronting Race: How A Confluence of 
Social Movements Convinced North Carolina to Go Where the McCleskey Court 
Wouldn’t, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 463, 464 (2011) (“North Carolina stands alone in 
providing capital defendants a strong claim for relief based on statistical evidence . . . .”) 
(citations omitted). 
20 Matt Smith, ‘Racial Justice Act’ Repealed in North Carolina, CNN (June 21, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/20/justice/north-carolina-death-penalty/; Josh Ellis and 
David Horn, GOP Lawmakers Plan to Address Racial Justice Act, NORTH CAROLINA 
NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 17 2011), http://www.ncnn.com/edit-news/6454-gop-lawmaker-
plan-to-address-racial-justice-act; Gary Robertson, N.C. House Panel Backs Repealing 
Racial Justice Act, NEWS & OBSERVER (June 6, 2011), http://www.victoriaadvocate.com 
/news/2011/jun/01/bc-nc-xgr-death-penalty1st-ld-writethru/. 
21 See also WRAL News, DAs Seek Repeal of Death Penalty Law (Nov. 15, 2011), 
http://www.wral.com/news/state/nccapitol/story/10383586/ (quoting District Attorney 
Scott Thomas, “[i]n its current form, generalized statewide statistics can be used to vacate 
every death sentence in North Carolina. We believe that death penalty decisions should 
be based upon the facts and the law of a particular case not on generalized unreliable 
statewide statistics.”). 
22 See id. 
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believed the right to use statistical evidence in this context is a statutory 
right only.23 This focus on the statutory right is misplaced. The use of 
statistical evidence to prove racial bias falls squarely inside a defendant’s 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free of, and prove, racial 
discrimination, as well as the Sixth Amendment right to a properly 
constituted jury. 
In light of the aims of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on discrimination, the Equal Protection Clause 
should naturally be interpreted to give defendants robust power to rely on 
“all relevant circumstances” and evidence, including statistics from other 
cases, to prove purposeful discrimination.24 The primary purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is to end all forms of governmental 
discrimination on account of race,”25 including the exclusion of potential 
jury members on account of race.26 Unquestionably, a defendant must 
have the right to prove discrimination before he may secure these 
constitutional protections.27 Therefore, while a state may be able to  
combat discrimination by conferring a statutory right on defendants to 
use statistical evidence in post-conviction proceedings, such a tactic 
would only clarify, not create, a defendant’s right to prove 
discrimination.28 
                                                                                                             
23 See Sen. Doug Berger, Senate Floor Debate on Racial Justice Act (May 14, 2009) 
(“[I]f states wanted to provide this additional protection and [allow statistics to] prove 
racial discrimination, then they could do it.”). Similarly, the notion that this evidentiary 
right flows only from statute, and not a defendant’s constitutional protections, has spurred 
advocacy groups to suggest and some states to consider passing additional racial justice 
acts to better arm potential victims of racial bias. This Article certainly does not criticize 
those working to produce racial justice acts in other states. These statutes are immensely 
valuable in providing needed clarity to the right and clearing the road in what could prove 
to be a more efficient manner than complex litigation campaigns. These statutes also can 
create a new cause of action for those whose appeals have been exhausted. Most 
importantly, as the North Carolina RJA has shown, they can spur new studies and 
discussion on issues of racial bias. 
24 Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79, 96–97 (1986). 
25 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303, 306–07 (1880); see also Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
26 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305 (this 132-year-old case has been continuously reaffirmed). 
In fact, the Court has explicitly held that “[p]urposeful racial discrimination in selection 
of the venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection because it denies him the 
protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. 
27 See e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“it is a general and 
indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or 
action at law.”). 
28 They may also be used to expand the right or to give a in conferring an additional 
“bite at the apple” in habeas cases, as the North Carolina RJA did. 
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Statistical evidence is a crucial tool for proving racial bias and 
effectuating constitutional rights. Properly-conducted studies can 
illuminate patterns and motivations for conduct that we cannot otherwise 
see, especially if we expand the inquiry to a large number of cases.29 In 
recognition of this fact, the Supreme Court has endorsed the use of 
statistics in proving patterns of discrimination in several other cases.30 
Yet, despite the Court’s endorsement of statistical evidence and its 
encouragement to look outside the four corners of a case, there is 
confusion as to whether a defendant can do both of these things—i.e. 
whether a defendant can use statistical evidence derived from events that 
occurred outside the four corners of the case. 
This Article provides some much needed guidance on this issue by 
examining the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding a defendant’s 
evidentiary rights when attempting to prove racial bias in the use of 
peremptory strikes. This Article will discuss the misguided interpretation 
of Supreme Court precedent put forward by some scholars. It will show 
that the Supreme Court did not impose the often-insurmountable burden 
of providing proof of discriminatory intent in each specific case.31 Next, 
the Article will examine the admissibility of statistical evidence in the 
peremptory strike context under accepted evidentiary standards, 
primarily the Federal Rules of Evidence. It will also compare the types of 
statistical evidence commonly accepted by courts in other contexts to 
show that statistical evidence provisions actually codify what the 
Fourteenth Amendment already demands: robust evidentiary rights to 
combat racial decimation. Finally, the Article will consider the two major 
methods for allowing defendants to introduce statistical evidence into 
wrongful conviction challenges: passage of a racial justice act or 
litigation designed to clarify the evidentiary right. 
                                                                                                             
29 RICHARD HARRIS, A PRIMER OF MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS (2001) (discussing the 
“inferential” applications and benefits of statistics and their ability to explain why things 
occur); see also RICHARD RUNYON, DESCRIPTIVE AND INFERENTIAL STATISTICS: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (1977). 
30 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) 
(invalidating a zoning ordinance on Equal Protection grounds); see also Bazemore v. 
Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986) (finding it acceptable to consider regression analysis 
demonstrating racial discrimination in salaries). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 
279, 280 (1987) (“This Court has accepted statistics as proof of intent to discriminate in 
the context of a State’s selection of the jury venire and in the context of statutory 
violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”). 
31 Namely, the Court’s decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 280 (1987), 
which has been seen as one of the worst Supreme Court decisions since Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, The Loss of Constitutional 
Faith: McClesky v. Kemp and the Dark Side of Procedure, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 5, 5 
(2012). 
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II. THE PROBLEM: PEREMPTORY STRIKES 
The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to 
distort the jury process by permitting the exclusion of 
jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to 
ban them entirely from the criminal justice system. 
 –Justice Thurgood Marshall32 
 
Both for cause33 and peremptory34 challenges can be used to exclude 
venire members from the jury. For cause challenges allow parties to 
remove venire members on the “narrowly specified, provable and legally 
cognizable basis of partiality.”35 Thus, for cause challenges exclude only 
those venire members who have demonstrated a readily observable bias 
and whose service on the jury could raise significant questions of 
partiality.36 In contrast, a peremptory challenge affords parties in a 
criminal or civil trial the right to excuse a set number of jury members 
absent a showing of any partiality.37 In other words, by using a 
peremptory challenge, a party can bar a venire member despite the 
judge’s determination that the he or she could render a fair, impartial 
verdict.38 Naturally, it is through the peremptory challenge that an 
attorney could most easily distort the racial composition of the jury. 
This practice of striking a juror for no particular reason is deeply 
rooted in English and American legal tradition. In fact, peremptory 
strikes date back to English common law39 and were already “venerable” 
in Blackstone’s time.40 As Blackstone observed in 1305, the “the law 
wills not that [a defendant] should be tried by any one man against whom 
[the defendant] has conceived a prejudice, even without being able to 
assign a reason for dislike.”41 
                                                                                                             
32 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106–07 (1986) (Marshall, J. concurring in 
judgment). 
33 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2012). 
34 FED. R. CRIM. P. 24. 
35 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (overruled on other grounds by 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 79). 
36 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. 
37 Id. (a peremptory challenge is “exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry 
and without being subject to the court’s control”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2012) 
(allowing peremptory strikes in civil cases). 
38 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 (b). 
39 JAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 302 (1883) 
(defendants in felony cases were given the right to challenge up to 35 jurors). 
40 United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000) (citing 4 W. 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 346-348 (1769)). 
41 BLACKSTONE, supra note 40, at 353. 
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The American legal system was quick to adopt this tactic, ironically 
seeing it as an important part of “reinforcing a defendant’s right to trial 
by an impartial jury.”42 In 1789, the Select Committee of the House of 
Representatives suggested that the Sixth Amendment contain a provision 
protecting the “right of challenge and other accustomed requisites,” 
including peremptory challenges.43 However, Congress rejected this 
proposed language on the grounds that this provision was not necessary: 
In Congress’s view, the right to a peremptory strike was already 
embodied in the term “impartial jury.”44 Since 1790, the exercise of 
peremptory strikes by defendants and prosecutors has been consistently 
upheld.45 Its use has been guided—albeit with mixed results—by the 
courts46 and by state statutes.47 Yet, despite Congress’s apparent faith in 
peremptory strikes as important tools for ensuring an impartial jury,48 
these unquestioned strikes have been widely used as a vehicle for 
discrimination based on race and gender.49 
Biased strikes violate the Equal Protection Clause and the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee to an impartial jury in three principal ways.50 
First, racially motivated strikes violate the purported guarantee that “the 
                                                                                                             
42 Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 311; see also Swain, 380 U.S. at 212–213; Pointer v. 
United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1984). 
43 Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 
TEMP. L. REV. 369, 374 (1992) (citing James Madison, Amendments to the New 
Constitution, GAZETTE OF THE U.S., Jun. 13, 1789, at 70). 
44 S. Mac Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional 
Right, 39 BROOK. L. REV. 290, 297–99 (1973); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Still, in 
1790, Congress clarified this right by giving defendants a statutory right to twenty 
peremptory challenges in capital cases. See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes 
Against the United States, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 119 (1790); see also Broderick, supra note 
44, at 374 (explaining the history of the peremptory strike in American law). 
45 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 n.22 (1986) (use of peremptory strikes “has 
long served the selection of an impartial jury”); id. at 112 (characterizing peremptory 
challenge as “procedure which has been part of the common law for many centuries and 
part of our jury system for nearly 200 years”) (Burger, J., dissenting); see also Swain, 380 
U.S. at 219 (“[t]he function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality 
on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will 
decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise”). 
46 See generally Batson, 476 U.S. at 79 (imposing constitutional limitations on the use 
of peremptory strikes); see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). 
47 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 (allowing peremptory strikes in criminal cases); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1870 (2012) (allowing peremptory strikes in civil cases). 
48 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2012). 
49 See United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844, 848 (8th Cir. 1975) (in 1974, the 
prosecutors in the Western District of Missouri struck 81% of black jurors peremptorily); 
State v. Washington, 375 So.2d 1162, 1164 (La. 1979) (a prosecutor admitted that he 
routinely struck black jurors). 
50 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (holding in part the Equal Protection clause forbid the 
prosecutor from challenging potential jurors solely on account of race). 
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State will not exclude members of [the defendant’s] race from the jury 
venire on account of race.”51 Second, they deprive the defendant of an 
impartial jury of his peers that has been “indifferently chose[n]” with 
respect to race.52 Finally, they violate the rights of individual jurors not 
to be excluded from jury service on the basis of race.53 
While antithetical to the notion of equal justice, jury exclusion has 
been a fixture of our justice system. Before the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, blacks were systematically and openly excluded from the 
courtroom and the jury box.54 These discriminatory actions were not only 
widely practiced and tolerated but were expressly and consistently 
condoned by the nation’s highest court.55 In fact, it was not until after the 
Reconstruction period that the Court’s jurisprudence on race-based jury 
discrimination began to, very slowly, breathe life into the promise of an 
impartial jury for all Americans.56 The Court began its attempt feebly, 
addressing only overt discrimination in the case at hand and turning a 
blind eye to all improper strikes in past cases.57 This myopic focus on 
specific and discrete acts proved debilitating as in most cases it is 
exceedingly difficult to prove that the any specific strike was actually 
motivated by race and not some pretextual reason, such as “demeanor” or 
“style of dress.”58 As the Court came to realize that its proposed 
solutions were ineffective, it began to expand the evidentiary net and 
                                                                                                             
51 Id. at 86 (citations omitted). 
52 Id. at 87 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)). 
53 Id.(stating that “[a] person’s race simply ‘is unrelated to his fitness as a juror’”) 
(quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting)). 
54 See e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 400 (1856) (“the plaintiff was not a 
citizen of the State of Missouri, as alleged in his declaration, being a negro of African 
descent, whose ancestors were of pure African blood, and who were brought into this 
country and sold as slaves”). In fact, many “Black Codes,” including those in North 
Carolina, went so far as to explicitly deny blacks the essential right to serve on juries. 
James B. Browning, The North Carolina Black Code, 15 J. NEGRO HIST. 461, 461–73 
(1930). Joseph A. Ranney, A Fool’s Errand? Legal Legacies of Reconstruction in Two 
Southern States, 9 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 16 (2002). 
55 Id. Is there a direct citation that corresponds to this sentence? See e.g., Dred Scott, 
60 U.S. at 400. 
56 For a discussion of each stage of this process, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE 
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S 
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2004). 
57 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879). 
58 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986). While Batson challenges do pose a 
non-trivial requirement on prosecutors to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the 
peremptory challenge, Batson is certainly not a complete solution of the problem. For the 
reasons discussed later in this paper, Batson challenges are often easily defeated and 
would only be able to weed out a very small number of cases. 
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consider other evidence of racial bias, including “patterns” of actions 
occurring “outside the four corners” of the case at hand.59 
Given the state of modern statistical analysis and its ability to find 
patterns from a large set of actions,60 this Article argues that statistical 
evidence clearly falls in line with the kinds of proof that the Court has 
recognized in its jurisprudence.61 As the following analysis demonstrates, 
the Court’s slow march toward a more and more inclusive stance on 
evidence of racial bias has been continually spurred by the realization 
that other more restrictive approaches fail to give full force to the 
protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.62 
A. Push Toward Greater Fourteenth Amendment Protections: 
Evidentiary Rights Under Strauder and Swain 
The Court’s 1880 decision in Strauder v. West Virginia marked the 
first major step toward securing the right of an impartial jury for all 
Americans. In Strauder, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider 
the constitutionality of a West Virginia statute that explicitly stated that 
only white people could serve on juries.63 In finding that such a practice 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment “not only gave citizenship and the privileges of citizenship 
to persons of color, but it denied any State the power to withhold from 
them the equal protection of the laws,” and that included among these 
protections is the right to an impartial jury.64 West Virginia violated this 
defendant’s equal protection rights when it tried him in front of a jury 
from which members of his own race had been purposefully excluded.65 
                                                                                                             
59 Miller-El v. Dretke at 239–240 . 
60 See HARRIS, supra note 29 (discussing the “inferential” applications and benefits of 
statistics and their ability to explain why things occur); see also RUNYON, supra note 29. 
61 For a discussion of patterns and statistics used in the employment discrimination 
context, see Tex. Dept. of Community Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981); see 
also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
62 Recent studies on racial bias in jury selection should act as the next impetus, 
compelling even more robust protection. For a discussion of the new studies and 
methods, see infra page 28. 
63 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306. 
64 Id. at 306–08 (1879) (“The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the 
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that 
is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as 
that which he holds.”). 
65 Id. (“[I]n the selection of jurors to pass upon [a defendant’s] life, liberty, or property, 
there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against them, because of 
their color.”); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1881); see also Virginia v. Rives, 
100 U.S. 313, 323 (1880). 
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Strauder represented a major step in stamping out discrimination and 
set the “foundation for the Court’s unceasing effort to eradicate racial 
discrimination in the procedures used to select the venire.”66 However, 
its focus on laws that on their face barred individuals from serving on a 
jury because of their race proved too narrow. Strauder did nothing to 
stop actions that were facially race-neutral but had the same deleterious 
effect the Strauder Court sought to stamp out, i.e. “lessen[ed] the 
security of [African Americans’] enjoyment of the rights which others 
enjoy.”67 
In the wake of Strauder, Southern states continued to discriminate 
against black jurors.68 Rather than drafting overtly discriminatory laws, 
state legislatures and prosecutors began passing laws and engaging in 
practices that were facially race-neutral69 but still had the effect of 
excluding African Americans from the jury box.70 For instance, many of 
these laws imposed requirements—usually financial—for service that 
most newly freed blacks could not meet. Other laws created very 
subjective requirements—such as high moral character or sufficient 
intelligence—that a prosecutor could easily manipulate to exclude 
whomever he wished.71 Given the excessively high burden of showing 
required under Strauder, black defendants could not effectively 
challenge these laws.72 Thus, African American venire members still 
faced significant statutory obstacles to jury service well after Strauder.73 
Indeed, prosecutors began using peremptory strikes and other 
exclusionary tactics against minorities at an alarming rate, effectively 
achieving the same outcome as the West Virginia statute.74 
The Court’s modest advancement against these tactics came in Swain 
v. Alabama. Swain reaffirmed that a “State’s purposeful or deliberate 
denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the 
                                                                                                             
66 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986). 
67 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310. 
68 For a discussion of various statutory obstacles to jury participation including the 
financial requirement of paying taxes and obviously subject requirements of “good moral 
character” and “sufficient intelligence,” see Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The 
Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North 
Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2050 (2010). 
69 For a discussion of various statutory obstacles to jury participation including the 
financial requirement of paying taxes and obviously subject requirements of “good moral 
character” and “sufficient intelligence,” see Seth Kotch & Robert P. Mosteller, The 
Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle with Race and the Death Penalty in North 
Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2050 (2010). 
70 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310. 
71 Id. My editor could not find this proposition in Strauder. Please review. 
72 See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308. 
73 See Kotch & Mosteller, supra note 68, at 2050. 
74 Id. 
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administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause.”75 
However, it went a step further, recognizing that racial discrimination 
can occur even in the exercise of a race-neutral law or practice.76 The 
Court held that a defendant can show racial discrimination if he can 
demonstrate that the prosecutor engaged in a “systemic pattern” of 
strikes against African Americans.77 
Despite its lofty goal, this ruling did little to actually promote equal 
protection in many cases. To satisfy the burden of proof under Swain, a 
defendant had to provide direct evidence of a systemic pattern of strikes 
against African Americans by the specific prosecutor in his jurisdiction.78 
Essentially, defendants had to “demonstrate that the peremptory 
challenge system had been ‘perverted.’”79 Thus, a defendant would fail 
under Swain unless he could show that the prosecutors in his jurisdiction 
had exercised their strikes to exclude blacks from the jury to 
systematically and uniformly strike African Americans, almost without 
exception.80  It was not enough to show that the process had failed him; 
he had to show that the process failed most minority defendants. Given 
the exceptionally high showing required under Swain, this requirement 
proved far too great for most defendants, and equal protection remained 
elusive.81 
B. Expansion to “All Relevant Circumstances”: Batson v. 
Kentucky 
In 1986, recognizing that the current legal regime had “placed on 
defendants a crippling burden of proof, making prosecutors’ peremptory 
challenges [ . . . ] largely immune from constitutional scrutiny,”82 the 
Court decided to increase the types of admissible evidence yet again. In 
Batson v. Kentucky, the Court dismissed the cumbersome requirement of 
                                                                                                             
75 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203–04 (1965) (overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79 (1986)). 
76 Id. 
77 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 226. 
78 Id. at 237. 
79 Construction and Application of Constitutional Rule of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 (1986), 8 A.L.R. FED. 2D 547 (originally published in 2006). 
80 Batson, 476 U.S. at 92. 
81 See id. 
82 Batson, 476 U.S. at 92–93, 103 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[m]isuse of the 
peremptory challenge to exclude black jurors has become both common and flagrant. 
Black defendants rarely have been able to compile statistics showing the extent of that 
practice.”). 
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having to show a systemic, jurisdiction-wide pattern of discrimination as 
inconsistent with the spirit of equal protection.83 
To establish a prima facie case under Batson, the defendant must 
first prove that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the 
prosecutor used peremptory challenges against members of the 
defendant’s race.84 “Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, 
as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges 
constitute a jury selection practice that permits ‘those to discriminate 
who are of a mind to discriminate.’”85 The defendant must then show 
that these facts, along with any other relevant circumstances, raise an 
inference that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to exclude venire 
members based on race.86 
Most importantly with regard to statistics, Batson directed the trial 
court to “consider all relevant circumstances” when examining a claim of 
discrimination and discriminatory intent.87 The Court’s examples of 
relevant circumstances included the prosecutor’s pattern of strikes 
against black venire members.88 The list of relevant circumstances also 
included circumstantial evidence of invidious intent and “under some 
circumstances proof of discriminatory impact.”89 Admittedly, the list of 
relevant circumstances did not explicitly mention the pattern of strikes in 
other cases or throughout other jurisdictions. However, the Court made 
clear that the list was “merely illustrative.” 90 In fact, the Court was so 
careful not to limit avenues of proof that it explicitly cautioned that this 
list is not exhaustive and advised that courts should give “significant 
deference” to the trial judge in deciding what other factors were relevant 
in making a prima facie case of discrimination.91 
The context of this opinion is helpful in understanding its breadth. 
This expansion to “all relevant circumstances” was a direct reaction to 
the practical difficulty in proving racial bias.92 Recognizing that 
evidentiary restrictions often frustrated the goal of equal protection, 
                                                                                                             
83 “[T]o dictate that ‘several must suffer discrimination’ before one could object would 
be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all.” Id. at 95 (Marshall, J. 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 960, 965). 
84 Id. at 96. 
85 Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). 
86 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–97. 
87 Id. at 96. The third requirement to establish a prima facie case generates the most 
controversy. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 93. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94. 
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Batson directed courts to consider “the totality of relevant facts.” 93Thus, 
by refusing to narrowly limit the scope of what was relevant, the Court 
demonstrated a clear desire to provide a true remedy for racial 
discrimination. 94 
However, the application of Batson had one significant 
shortcoming.95 Under Batson, the prosecution can defeat a challenge by 
providing a plausible non-racial explanation for the strike.96 Since the 
peremptory strike, by its very nature, affords the privilege to excuse 
certain jury members without an articulable reason, this requirement was 
often very easy to satisfy.97 Even though the explanation has to be “clear 
and reasonably specific,” there proved to be far too many acceptable non-
racial reasons for excusing a juror. 98 For instance, prosecutors were 
allowed to excuse jurors for vague, nondescript reasons such as poor 
body language and demeanor or low intelligence.99 Thus, a skilled 
prosecutor could exercise racially motivated peremptory strikes yet still 
provide a plausible, albeit fictitious, non-racial reason for each strike.100 
This difficulty created serious problems of enforcement that prosecutors 
exploit to this day.101 
C. A Setback For Statistical Evidence or A Misinterpreted 
Holding?: McCleskey v. Kemp 
Batson’s shortcoming has been heavily exploited. Prosecutors are 
consistently able to point to a non-racial reason for  strikes, making it 
extremely difficult to prove discriminatory intent on a case-by-case 
basis. 102 In response, defendants tried to show racial bias in other stages 
                                                                                                             
93 Id. at 96. 
94 Id. at 94. 
95 Id. 
96 See id. at 106. 
97 See id. 
98 Id. at 124. 
99 See, e.g., People v. Mack, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (1989) (casual manner); United 
States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010–11 (5th Cir. 1987) (“posture and demeanor”); 
United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir. 1987) (“poor attitude”); United 
States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1070–71 (5th Cir. 1987) (“avoidance of eye contact”). 
100 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987). 
101 See, e.g., Alan Raphael, Discriminatory Jury Selection: Lower Court 
Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 293, 349 (1989) 
(discussing the difficulty of proving racial bias under Batson); David D. Hopper, Note, 
Batson v. Kentucky and the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and 
Capricious Equal Protection?, 74 VA. L. REV. 811, 836–38 (1988). 
102 Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury 
Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, 
and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 162 (2010) (“Not surprisingly, 
Batson has engendered an enormous amount of often virulent criticism . . . . One even 
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and through other means. One of the most well-known attempts, and the 
one whose eventual failure is most commonly cited by opponents of 
statistics, is Warren McCleskey’s push to invalidate the Georgia death 
penalty because of its disparate impact against blacks.103 
In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court examined “whether a complex 
statistical study that indicates a risk that racial considerations enter into 
capital sentencing determinations proves that petitioner McCleskey’s 
capital sentence is unconstitutional under the Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendment.”104 The statistical study in McCleskey showed that the 
death penalty in Georgia was imposed more often against black 
defendants and killers of white victims.105 Specifically, it “found that 
prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases involving black 
defendants and white victims; 32% of the cases involving white 
defendants and white victims; 15% of the cases involving black 
defendants and black victims; and 19% of the cases involving white 
defendants and black victims.”106 . 
The McCleskey Court noted that statistics are acceptable proof of 
intent to discriminate in some contexts, such as an “equal protection 
violation in the selection of the jury venire in a particular district.”107 
While it found that statistics generally must show a “stark pattern to be 
accepted as the sole proof of discriminatory intent under the 
Constitution,” the Court also noted that due to “the nature of jury-
selection [courts] have permitted a finding of constitutional violation 
even when the statistical pattern does not approach such extremes.”108 
                                                                                                             
less charitable commentator has said, ‘Batson is either a disingenuous charade or an ill-
conceived sinkhole.” Batson and its progeny appear to remain ineffective, despite the fact 
that other members of the Court have recognized the role of implicit bias in the legal 
system.). 
103 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279. For a discussion of the political efforts leading up to 
the enactment of the law and the evidence of discrimination, see Landmark: McCleskey 
v. Kemp, NAACPLDF, http://www.naacpldf.org/case/mccleskey-v-kemp (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2015). 
104 Id. Notably, this case examined whether the disparate impact and imposition of the 
death penalty makes the use of the death penalty unconstitutional in that state, and only 
tangentially touches on the use of peremptory strikes that might lead to this end result. 
For an excellent discussion of McCleskey and its political and social consequences, see 
Caitlin Naidoff, Confronting the Fear of “Too Much Justice”: The Need for a Texas 
Racial Justice Act, 19 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 169 (2013). 
105 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 321. 
106 Id. at 287. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 
(1977). The Court gives several examples including Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 
495 (1977) (2-to-1 disparity between Mexican-Americans in county population and those 
summoned for grand jury duty); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359 (1970) (1.6-to-1 
disparity between blacks in county population and those on grand jury lists); Whitus v. 
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The Court’s recognition of the myriad opportunities for subtle acts of 
discrimination as well as the importance of statistics suggested that it 
might respond by lowering the evidentiary burden in the jury-selection 
context. But the Court took a different approach. It found that 
McCleskey’s statistics, while they showed a racial disparity, did not 
demand an inference of racial discrimination.109  Rather, the Court 
reasoned, the study “indicate[d] [only] a discrepancy that appears to 
correlate with race,” which the Court felt was a “far cry from [a] major 
systemic defect.”110 
According to the Court, a mere statistical correlation is not enough to 
demonstrate bias in this context because the decision to impose the death 
penalty is fundamentally different from other instances in which statistics 
have been used. In other words, the ultimate decision to impose the death 
penalty is based on “innumerable factors that vary according to the 
characteristics of the individual defendant and the facts of a particular 
case” and, therefore, cannot be analyzed through statistics.111 According 
to the Court, it would be nearly impossible to analyze the considerations 
that go into these decisions for each jury member and the prosecutor 
when deciding to impose a sentence of death because it would be 
impossible to control for any single aspect of the discretionary decision-
making process.112 
This holding was seemingly premised on two points.  As a general 
rule, mere correlation does not necessarily demonstrate causation.113 
And, more specifically, disparities in the degree of punishment may 
simply be a product of both prosecutorial as well as juror discretion, 
something the Justices saw as an “inevitable114 part of our criminal 
justice system.”115 According to the Court, prosecutors and jurors have to 
make complex decisions on a variety of factors when deciding the 
appropriate punishment for a crime.116 As long as our system affords 
prosecutors and juries such broad discretion in criminal trials, the 
                                                                                                             
Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967) (3-to-1 disparity between eligible blacks in county 
and blacks on grand jury venire). 
109 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286 (“defendants charged with killing blacks received the 
death penalty in only 1% of the cases. The raw numbers also indicate a reverse racial 
disparity according to the race of the defendant: 4% of the black defendants received the 
death penalty, as opposed to 7% of the white defendants.”). 
110 Id. at 312. 
111 Id. at 294. 
112 See id. at 294–95. 
113 Id. 
114 And apparently excusable. 
115 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312–13. 
116 Id. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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imposition of punishment cannot be uniform.117 Since this discretion is 
deemed such a “fundamental value of jury trial,” the Court “decline[d] to 
assume that what is unexplained is invidious.”118 
In its defense of discretion and its resulting discrepancies, the Court 
also pointed to procedural safeguards that make the process as fair as 
possible.119 The Court noted that chief among these safeguards is a 
“properly constituted venire” to come to an impartial decision.120 Even if 
the prosecutor had racist motives for seeking the death penalty, the jury 
theoretically will act as an impartial check to these biases.121 
If all of the factors the Court assumed were true the Court’s 
reasoning is at least arguably plausible in the context of general 
disparities in sentencing. Juries are a fundamentally important 
component of our legal system and are ultimately tasked with 
determining guilt or innocence. 122 Therefore, it should be very difficult 
to overturn a properly constituted jury’s considered judgment.  However, 
applying McCleskey’s reasoning, as opponents of statistical evidence 
have done, to the jury selection context is a fundamental mistake. 
Unquestionably, the jury cannot serve as an effective check if it is 
selected in a discriminatory fashion. When the defendant argues a Batson 
challenge, he is challenging that very assumption; he claims that this jury 
is not impartial.123 Therefore, to apply McCleskey to discriminatory 
strikes is to assume as true the very issue in question. 
Refusing to apply McCleskey in the context of jury selection is not 
an indictment of McCleskey as McCleskey was not about jury selection. 
On the contrary, it was a case about disparate impact in capital 
sentencing that assumed proper jury selection.124 The statistics 
undoubtedly showed that race was strongly correlated to the death 
                                                                                                             
117 Id. at 297. 
118 Id. at 313. 
119 Id. at 313 (citing Singer v. United States, supra, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965)). 
120 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 294. 
121 It is a fundamental notion of our legal system that a properly constituted jury of 
one’s peers serves an invaluable check on the arbitrary exercise of government power. 
See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The jury secures the criminal defendant’s fundamental 
“protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice.” Strauder v. West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880). 
122 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
123 See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson et. al., Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit 
Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513 
(2014) (finding evidence of implicit racial bias in a juror’s perception criminal 
defendant’s case); see also Patrick Bayer, et al., The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal 
Trials, DUKE POP. RESEARCH INST. (June 2011) (analyzing the effect of different racial 
compositions of jury on criminal verdicts). 
124 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295 (“each particular decision to impose the death 
penalty is made by a petit jury selected from a properly constituted venire”). 
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penalty.125 However, the defendant was challenging the decision to seek 
the death penalty and, in doing so, seemingly indicting the racial 
motivations of the prosecutor, judge, and jury.126 That the Court was 
noticeably hesitant to permit a statistical finding to overturn the decision 
of what it assumed to be an impartial jury is in some ways not 
surprising.127 After all, to do so would challenge a fundamental tenet of 
our justice system that jury decisions are not affected by racial or other 
bias.128 The study did not show, nor did it purport to show, that the jury 
was improperly selected or that it was the product of racial bias.129 Based 
on the question presented and the concepts at issue, the Court exercised 
what it perceived as restraint and held that this specific statistical 
analysis (which only showed a racial discrepancy) is, on its own, 
insufficient to invalidate a death sentence.130 
Another matter that bears mentioning here is the oft-repeated 
contention that McCleskey leaves the decision of whether statistics can 
be used to show racial discrimination to the state legislature.131 
McCleskey recognized the role of states in meting out punishments for 
crimes. However, the language in McCleskey regarding state legislatures 
refers to the disparate impact of the death penalty in Georgia and whether 
maintaining capital punishment is appropriate in light of the Eighth 
Amendment.132 The Eighth Amendment is interpreted in such a way as to 
protect the “dignity of man” and is determined based on “evolving 
standards of decency.”133 Naturally, this standard makes more room for 
legislative input than the Fourteenth Amendment, whose dictates are 
clear. Accordingly, the Court declined to weigh in on the legislative 
determination of what the precise standards of dignity are in the State of 
Georgia.134 However, the Court did not say that the admissibility of 
                                                                                                             
125 See id. at 285. 
126 Id. 
127 See id. Whether this hesitation is appropriate is another matter entirely. 
128 See id. 
129 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296. Furthermore, as opposed to a Batson challenge, the 
jurors did not have an opportunity to explain why their decision was not racially biased. 
130 Id at 297. 
131 NC Republicans Propose Racial Injustice Act, BLUE NC (Apr. 5, 2011), 
http://www.bluenc.com/nc-republicans-propose-racial-injustice-act; see also Moving 
Beyond “Racial Blindsight”? The Influence of Social Science Evidence After the North 
Carolina Racial Injustice Act, MICH. ST. UNIV. COLLEGE OF LAW (2010), 
http://law.msu.edu/blindsight/introduction.html. 
132 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 300. 
133 Id. 
134 “First among these indicia are the decisions of state legislatures, ‘because the . . . 
legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining’ contemporary standards.” Id. (citing 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 175 (1976)). 
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statistics, or any other relevant evidence to prove racial discrimination, 
should be determined exclusively by the states. 
In fact, it could not have made such a claim. There can be no 
question that states are absolutely barred from denying African 
Americans the protection of an impartial jury. The Court has 
continuously upheld that principle by striking down laws and limiting 
practices that enforced or allowed racial discrimination as repugnant to 
the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.135 It has also held that 
the imposition of unnecessary evidentiary hurdles renders the Fourteenth 
Amendment ineffective. Since peremptory strikes can be used to 
discriminate, a defendant must have the right to challenge them when 
they are used in a discriminatory fashion.136 Thus, states cannot limit the 
use of evidence that the Court has deemed necessary in making out a 
claim of discrimination.137 An alternative holding would effectively 
allow states to circumvent the Fourteenth Amendment—the very 
amendment designed to prevent the states from discriminating.138 
D. Expanding Outside the “Four Corners” of the Case: 
Miller-El v. Dretke 
Subtle tactics of racial exclusion have always been a problem.139 For 
example, in 1948 the Clerk of Court for Bertie County, North Carolina 
admitted to printing the names of black jury pool members in red and the 
names of whites in black so that the prosecutor could achieve an all-
white jury without ever meeting the members.140 Decades following 
State v. Speller, racially driven exclusionary tactics had become more 
advanced and increasingly difficult to prove. By 2005, the use of racial 
stereotypes seemed even “better organized and more systematized than 
ever before.”141 In a bizarre twist, at least one District Attorney’s office 
used a statistical “demographic analysis” to decide which races and 
                                                                                                             
135 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
136 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 300 (citations omitted). 
137 See e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“it is a general and 
indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or 
action at law . . .”). 
138 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
139 Olatunde Johnson, Legislating Racial Fairness In Criminal Justice, COL. HUMAN 
RIGHTS L. REV. 233 (2008); Frank Baumgartner, Detecting Bias Essential in Death 
Penalty Cases, THE BURLINGTON TIMES (Nov. 26, 2011) https://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/ 
Innocence/NC/Burlington-Times-News-RJA-Nov-26-2011.pdf. 
140 State v. Speller, 47 S.E.2d 537, 538 (N.C. 1948). 
141 See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 270 (2005). 
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genders to strike.142 In this way, the prevailing interpretation of 
McCleskey yielded an absurd result—prosecutors were using statistics to 
more effectively discriminate, yet defendants could not show this 
discrimination through statistical evidence of their own. 
The Court attempted to address the problem of overly restrictive 
evidentiary hurdles and follow Batson’s move toward “less discouraging 
standards for assessing a claim of purposeful discrimination” in the 
capstone case of Miller-El v. Dretke. 143 The Miller-El Court recognized: 
although the move from Swain to Batson left a defendant 
free to challenge the prosecution without having to cast 
Swain’s wide net, the net was not entirely consigned to 
history, for Batson’s individualized focus came with a 
weakness of its own owing to its very emphasis on the 
particular reasons a prosecutor might give . . . If any 
facially neutral reason sufficed to answer a Batson 
challenge, then Batson would not amount to much more 
than Swain . . . Some stated reasons are false, and 
although some false reasons are shown within the four 
corners of a given case, sometimes a court may not be 
sure unless it looks beyond the case at hand.144 
The Court relied, in part, on the “all relevant circumstances” 
language in Batson to justify looking outside of the “four corners” of the 
defendant’s case to find racial discrimination by the Dallas County, 
Texas District Attorney’s Office.145 In an attempt to discover the true 
intent of the prosecution, the Court looked past the evidence from Miller-
El’s own case to patterns of racial discrimination in the prosecutorial 
district.146 In addition to statistics from Miller-El’s own trial that showed 
the prosecution peremptorily struck 10 out of 14 blacks from the jury, the 
Court looked to side-by-side comparisons of struck blacks and whites as 
well as the District Attorney’s Office historical jury selection 
practices.147 
Several components of the Court’s opinion suggest an implicit 
endorsement of statistics. First, the Court examined a wide array of 
                                                                                                             
142 See id. (“one jury-selection guide counsels attorneys to perform a “demographic 
analysis” that assigns numerical points to characteristics such as age, occupation, and 
marital status—in addition to race”). 
143 Id. at 239. 
144 Id. at 239–40. 
145 Id. at 240. 
146 See id. at 266. 
147 Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241. 
124 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:103 
 
“relevant circumstances” to discover discriminatory intent.148 The 
evidence included the State’s long-standing practice of strategic “jury 
shuffling” that sought to keep African Americans toward the back of the 
venire panel.149 Jury shuffling refers to a procedure by which one side 
can change the order in which prospective jurors will be called for voir 
dire examination.150 This process, when employed at the proper time, 
ensures that most African Americans would be called on later in the 
selection process or potentially not at all.151 Therefore, prosecutors could 
effectively bar minorities from the jury without having to strike them. By 
purposefully seeking to exclude jurors based solely on their race, this use 
of jury shuffling falls squarely in the category of prohibited 
discrimination.152 However, it would be difficult, if not impossible to 
prove that jury shuffling in any one case was racially motivated.153 The 
sample size would be far too low, allowing a prosecutor to explain away 
individual shuffles as mere exercises of discretion.154 
Second, and most importantly, the Court looked to the aggregate of 
cases in Dallas County to find a policy of racist strikes.155 The Court 
found that “for decades” before this trial, “the Dallas County office had 
followed a specific policy of systematically excluding blacks from 
juries.”156 In support of this claim, the Court pointed to direct testimony 
that prosecutors were sometimes encouraged to exclude blacks. For 
                                                                                                             
148 Id at 240. 
149 “[T]he prosecution’s decision to seek a jury shuffle when a predominant number of 
African–Americans were seated in the front of the panel, along with its decision to delay 
a formal objection to the defense’s shuffle until after the new racial composition was 
revealed, raise a suspicion that the State sought to exclude African–Americans from the 
jury. Our concerns are amplified by the fact that the state court also had before it, and 
apparently ignored, testimony demonstrating that the Dallas County District Attorney’s 
Office had, by its own admission, used this process to manipulate the racial composition 
of the jury in the past.” Id. at 254 (citations omitted). 
150 See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 35.11 (West 2015). Though the statute calls 
on the clerk to make such requests, the transcript in Miller-El proved that both sides made 
the shuffles. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 306. See also Edward Lazarus, A Death Penalty Case 
the Supreme Court May Review Shows the Dysfunction of the Federal Judiciary When it 
Comes to Capital Punishment, FINDLAW, (June 24, 2004), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ 
lazarus/20040624.html. 
151 See 5 WITKIN, CAL. CRIM. LAW 3D (2000) Crim Trial, § 496, p. 702 (2008 
Supplement). 
152 Id. 
153 Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 254. 
154 Peter Peduzzi, et. al, A Simulation of the Number of Events Per Variable in Logistic 
Regression Analysis, 49 J. OF CLINICAL STATISTICS 1737 (1996) (discussing the 
importance of a statistically significant sample size in isolating variables and finding 
patterns in behavior and responses). 
155 Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 254. 
156 Id. at 263. 
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instance, a former assistant in the District Attorney’s office stated that 
“his superior warned him that he would be fired if he permitted any 
African–Americans to serve on a jury.” 157 Prosecutors were even given a 
manual that justified racial exclusion from jury service.158 Both forms of 
evidence showed that the Dallas County office had, for some time, 
supported racial profiling in jury selection.159 
However, none of the evidence dealt with Miller-El’s case in 
particular. In fact, the manual was merely “available” to only one 
prosecutor in the office at the time of Miller-El’s trial.160 There was no 
evidence that the prosecutor actually used or read the manual. Indeed, the 
District Attorney’s office argued that the manual was no longer in 
circulation when Miller-El was arrested for the crime.161 Under some 
interpretations of McCleskey, this evidence would not be admissible to 
prove racial bias in this defendant’s case as it could not be directly and 
conclusively tied to the disposition of the matter before the Court.162 
Nevertheless, the Court looked beyond this issue and found adequate 
evidence of racial bias.163 This holding not only called on courts to look 
past the case at hand, but it also exhorted them to strike actions that may 
not have indisputable and direct evidence of bias.164 The Court admitted 
that “peremptories are often the subjects of instinct, and it can sometimes 
be hard to say what the reason is.”165 “But when illegitimate grounds like 
race are in issue” the courts must look beyond the “pretextual” reasons to 
prevent bias.166 In so stating, the Court reaffirmed the sentiment 
previously expressed in Batson that the courts must make a meaningful 
effort to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A crucial part of this effort involves looking beyond an individual 
case for indirect evidence of patterns and policies; a look that should 
naturally be aided by statistics. 
                                                                                                             
157 Id. at 263; “Similarly, another Dallas County district judge and former assistant 
district attorney from 1976 to 1978 testified that he believed the office had a systematic 
policy of excluding African–Americans from juries.” See id. at 264. 
158 The “Jury Selection in A Criminal Case” manual outlined the reasoning behind 
excluding minorities from jury service. See id. at 334–35. 
159 Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 265–66. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 283. 
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164 See id. at 284. 
165 Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 252 (internal citations omitted). 
166 Id. 
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III. THE NEXT STEP: STATISTICS 
As set forth above, the historic arc of the Court’s jurisprudence 
bends toward inclusion of many forms of indirect evidence, specifically 
evidence outside the “four corners” of the case that can demonstrate a 
“pattern” of racially biased strikes. However, the legal debate has 
focused almost exclusively on one form of indirect evidence—statistics.   
Advocates of statistics point out that statistical models are 
immensely helpful in detecting relationships and behavioral patterns.167 
They are widely used to predict and discern patterns and behavior in a 
variety of fields, including oncology, sociology, and behavioral 
psychology.168 By isolating potentially relevant variables, models can 
determine whether the observed patterns reflect corresponding patterns in 
decision making or are merely random fluctuations that merely correlate 
with the variable at issue.169 In other words, inferential statistics can help 
determine whether a prosecutor’s decision to strike a black juror was 
caused by the juror’s race or if the juror’s race was not a factor in the 
decision. 
Despite its theoretical attractiveness, statistical evidence must still 
pass muster under the Federal Rules of Evidence before it is admitted. 
First, statistics must have the tendency to make a relevant fact more or 
less probable.170 The relevant fact is the motive for the prosecutor’s 
decision to excuse a juror: Was the purported non-racial reason the actual 
reason or was it pretext for a racially biased action? With respect to this 
point, there can almost be no question that statistics are relevant. The 
Supreme Court has specifically endorsed the use of statistics to prove 
pretext in other contexts—most notably in employment discrimination.171 
In Title VII cases, plaintiffs are able to use statistical patterns in hiring, 
firing, and promotion to demonstrate that an employer’s asserted reason 
for its employment decisions are not the true ones. 172 
For instance, in International Brotherhood. Of Teamsters v. United 
States, the Court held that a plaintiff can use evidence of gross statistical 
disparities to show a pattern and practice of racial discrimination. 173 In 
                                                                                                             
167 FREDERICK GRAVETTER, STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 124 (2012). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
171 Members of the Court have also looked to statistical evidence in other cases, 
including in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (examining the deterrent effect of 
capital punishment). 
172 See, e.g., Obrey v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 691, 698 (9th Cir. 2005). In Obrey, the Ninth 
Circuit found that a statistical report tending to show a correlation between race and 
promotion constituted additional evidence of discrimination. 
173 431 U.S. 324, 338 (1977). 
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that case, the plaintiff presented evidence that African American 
employers were hardly ever promoted to “line driver” to show that she 
was not promoted due to her race.174 In fact, only one African American 
in the entire company had been promoted to this position, while whites 
were promoted at a very high rate. Finding that “statistical analyses have 
served and will continue to serve an important role in which the 
existence of discrimination is a disputed issue,” the Court found that this 
evidence demonstrated discriminatory intent.175 
Statistics involving a large number of cases have been most heavily 
attacked. However, statistical evidence that incorporates a large number 
of cases and actions yields more, not less, reliable data than evidence 
from just one case.176 The largest hurdle to a reliable statistical model is 
variability; each interaction contains some unique circumstances and 
outlying considerations that could explain the phenomena.177 In other 
words, in any one case the prosecutor may actually have a negative 
feeling about a juror that has nothing to do with the juror’s race. 
Therefore, his striking of that one juror may not tell us much about why 
he engages in strikes. 
The variability problem is controlled by increasing the number of 
iterations. That is, the more prosecutor strikes that occur, the less likely 
any outlying considerations, such as an individual’s personality, is to 
skew the data sample. As a threshold matter, we can certainly say that 
the average African American juror is as qualified to serve as any other 
juror, i.e. his demeanor, intellect, and mannerisms are no more 
objectionable than the average non-black juror. However, we cannot say 
that each African American (or white) juror in any specific case 
represents the “average” juror. Therefore, it is quite possible that one 
specific juror really does have a bad demeanor and just happens to be 
black. Thus, it is difficult to read much into the fact that this juror was 
excluded. 
However, evidence that the prosecutor consistently, over a large 
number of cases, strikes black jurors at a very high rate tells a different 
story. The effect of any outliers is minimized, and we are more justified 
in relying on what we know about the general population of African 
Americans—that they are as qualified to serve as the general white 
population. Accordingly, with each additional striking of a black or white 
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juror the prosecutor paints a clearer picture of his racial biases, or lack 
thereof. 
The statistical study employed pursuant to North Carolina’s RJA 
demonstrated such a pattern of racial bias. In North Carolina v. 
Robinson, the first case brought under the RJA, the Cumberland County 
Superior Court considered statistical evidence of racial bias in that 
prosecutorial district and county. Upon review of the evidence, Judge 
Weeks endorsed the quality of the study, finding that the statistical 
analysis showed “race, not reservations about the death penalty, not 
connections to the criminal justice system, but race, drives prosecution 
decisions about which citizens may participate in one of the most 
important and visible aspects of democratic government.”178 
Still, despite their ability to illuminate patterns and motivations, 
statistics are usually attacked on relevance grounds. The major argument 
against statistical evidence is thatit does not prove that any specific strike 
was done for racial reasons.179 This perceived problem manifests in two 
major ways: at the individual level and at the regional, state, or district 
level. 
The problems at the individual level stem from one concern: people 
do not always follow the same pattern. In other words, even though a 
prosecutor has engaged in a pattern of racially biased actions, he might 
not have made any racist strikes in this defendant’s case.180 Quite simply, 
the prosecutor, who normally strikes due to race and uses demeanor or 
attire as his pretexts, may actually have stuck a specific juror because of 
his poor demeanor or sloppy dress.  Yet, under the statistical evidence 
approach, a defendant would still obtain relief by proving that the 
prosecutor habitually strikes African American jurors in other cases.181 
                                                                                                             
178 Order Granting Motions for Appropriate Relief at *2–3, North Carolina v. Golphin 
et al., Nos. 97 CRS 47314-15, 98 CRS 34832, 35044, 01 CRS 65079, (N.C. Sup. Ct. Dec. 
13, 2012). 
179 See e.g., Jordan, DAs Seek Repeal of Death Penalty Law, WRAL (Nov. 15, 2011) 
(quoting District Attorney Scott Thomas “[i]n its current form, generalized statewide 
statistics can be used to vacate every death sentence in North Carolina. We believe that 
death penalty decisions should be based upon the facts and the law of a particular case 
not on generalized unreliable statewide statistics”); see also Frank Baumgartner, 
Detecting bias essential in death penalty cases, THE BURLINGTON TIMES-NEWS (Nov. 26, 
2011), http://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/Innocence/NC/Burlington-Times-News-RJA-Nov-
26-2011.pdf. 
180 In fact, character evidence is strictly barred to prove that a party acted in 
conformance with that character trait in any given instance. See FED. R. EVID. 404. 
181 Kim Severson, North Carolina Repeals Law Allowing Racial Bias Claim in Death 
Penalty Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, (Jun. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/us/ 
racial-justice-act-repealed-in-north-carolina.html (reporting concern that “a white 
supremacist who murdered an African-American could argue he was a victim of racism if 
blacks were on the jury.”). 
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In the second scenario, the individual prosecutor may not have any 
noticeable biases.182 However, his office engaged in a noticeable pattern 
of striking African American jurors throughout the district, 
demonstrating a clear racial bias.183 Under most conceptions of a racial 
justice act, any defendant in which this prosecutor picked the jury would 
be entitled to some form of relief on the grounds that the prosecutorial 
district is corrupted. Therefore, even if a prosecutor does not engage in a 
pattern of racially-motivated strikes, his actions may still be viewed in 
light of the general actions of the district or even state over which he has 
no control.184 
In many ways, these scenarios appear unsettling. However, these 
issues do not doom the use of statistics, nor do they compromise the 
legitimacy of broader statistical evidence. First, there are extraordinary 
institutional benefits to vacating even these “untainted” sentences. In 
both of the above-described scenarios, the justice system failed to afford 
a certain number of its defendants the fundamental right to equal 
protection of the laws.185 The prosecutorial system was broken.186 Public 
trust and confidence in a racially-tainted prosecutorial mechanism would, 
and should, be extraordinarily limited. Even though an individual capital 
sentence may have somehow avoided the effects of racial bias, it may not 
escape untainted in the public’s eye.187 
Next, the Supreme Court has already decided that, on the balance, 
vacating individual sentences that are not clearly the product of racial 
bias is necessary to properly effectuate the protections of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.188 As has been mentioned above, direct proof of racial bias 
                                                                                                             
182 This concern was briefly mentioned by the Court in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 
322, 335 (2003). 
183 See id. 
184 See id. 
185 “Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries 
undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.” Batson v. 
Kentucky,, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). 
186 “Twenty years have passed since this Court declared that the death penalty must be 
imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all, and, despite the effort of 
the states and courts to devise legal formulas and procedural rules to meet this daunting 
challenge, the death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, 
and mistake.” Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143–44 (1994) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (Supreme Court denial of review). 
187 Will Matthews, ACLU Lens: North Carolina Repeals Historic Legislation 
Combating Racism in Death Penalty, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (Nov. 29, 2011, 2:45 PM), 
http://www.aclu.org/blog/capital-punishment-racial-justice/aclu-lens-north-carolina-
repeals-historic-legislation (discussing harm from public perceptions of illegitimate 
convictions). 
188 See generally Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); Strauder v. West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
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is extraordinarily difficult to achieve.189 Even if an individual has 
suffered from racial bias, it may be impossible to prove on an individual 
act level.190 Recognizing this problem, the Court has decided that it is 
prudent and just to look for indirect proof outside the four corners of the 
case.191 The fact that some cases in which race may not have been a 
defining factor are called into question might be an unavoidable 
necessity. 
Finally, cultures of discrimination have indirect effects. A prosecutor 
employed in a biased district may be more likely to strike a defendant 
due to race than he would have been absent the biased culture. Thus, 
regardless of the prosecutor’s intent, the harm is essentially the same: An 
African American defendant is more likely to receive an unfair trial 
because he is an African American. While the justifiability of statistical 
evidence likely cannot hinge solely on indirect effects, the fact that racial 
discrimination produces often unmeasurable negative side effects 
counsels toward restraint and caution when dealing with a broken 
system. 
IV. SOLUTIONS: STATUTES OR LAWSUITS? 
Statistical evidence has rarely had its day in court against peremptory 
strikes. The most commonly discussed tactic for solving this problem is a 
political one: states could pass a racial justice act conferring the statutory 
right to use statistical evidence.192 Most advocates seeking to change the 
current evidentiary regime have advocated for a change in the laws.193 
Such a statutory conferral of rights would be an ideal outcome in many 
ways.194 The right would be explicitly stated in the legislation and there 
could be little contestation over whether the statutory right applies. 
Moreover, as in the case with the North Carolina Racial Justice Act, a 
specific law could afford individuals who have exhausted their appeals 
the ability to raise a new argument. However, the political option is also 
plagued by problems, some inherent to the political system itself and 
some unique to capital litigation. 
Political solutions—generally hard to come by—are especially 
difficult in the capital punishment context. From a pragmatic perspective, 
                                                                                                             
189 Batson, 476 U.S. at 79. 
190 See discussion of statistics and variability supra. 
191 Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 231(2005). 
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193 Naidoff, supra note 104. 
194 See id. at 182–83 (discussing the successful litigation under North Carolina’s 
statute). 
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political solutions are generally slow and often face challenges extrinsic 
to the issue’s legal merit, such as public perception and political 
allegiances.195 Passing legislation in the death penalty context raises an 
extra hurdle. Protections for individuals accused of capital crimes 
necessarily protect individuals who are accused of some of the most 
severe crimes.196 Like the Fourth Amendment exclusionary principle that 
often operates to the advantage of the “guilty,” the obvious targeted 
beneficiary of a racial justice act is someone convicted of engaging in a 
capital offense.197 Thus, elected officials, who often feel pressured to be 
“tough on crime,” might be even more hesitant to advocate reform that 
could vacate a death sentence.198 
Moreover, a “racial justice act” is, at its core, a humble 
acknowledgement of a state’s flawed history and its failure to serve its 
citizens, especially members of minority groups.199 Without at least 
implying that racial bias might have existed—or still does—in the 
criminal justice system, a racial justice act would appear unnecessary. 
Politicians and constituents must be willing to admit that the legal system 
suffers from some of the same racial biases that have plagued the 
American system since its founding. Finally, given the often-shocking 
nature criminal actions that spawn capital trials, it is all too easy to lose 
focus on the foundational constitutional protections and ask for some sort 
of “vengeance.” 
Political tides may shift and wash away any hard won-victories. 
North Carolina’s experience is an excellent paradigm for the often 
ephemeral nature of some political successes. In 2010, North Carolina 
was able to overcome several political hurdles and pass the Racial Justice 
Act.200 Through the work of dedicated advocates, especially those at the 
ACLU Capital Punishment Project and the NAACP, statistical evidence 
of racial bias in Cumberland County, North Carolina was used to vacate 
                                                                                                             
195 This paper will not discuss these issues in any length. 
196 In the criminal context, rights are often effectuated by the exclusion of otherwise 
relevant evidence. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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the death sentence against Marcus Robinson and commute it to a term of 
life in prison.201  While this result garnered significant praise in many 
circles, the success of statistics in proving racial bias did not sit well with 
some North Carolina politicians. When the North Carolina Assembly 
experienced a radical political shift, it gutted the RJA and removed its 
statistical evidence provision.202 While North Carolina was able to pull 
off a remarkable achievement by marshalling the political will to pass a 
law allowing the introduction of statistical evidence and using it to show 
that racial bias infected the criminal justice system, its advancements 
were short-lived. 
Despite this result, this Article argues that the protections identified 
in the RJA are not lost; a defendant may still vindicate these rights 
through constitutional litigation. North Carolina’s Act codified the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on Fourteenth Amendment protections 
against racially motivated peremptory strikes in three important ways. 
First, the RJA prevents the imposition of any capital sentence that was 
sought or obtained based on race.203 This component of the RJA flows 
directly from the Court’s decisions from Strauder to Brown to the 
present day that the Fourteenth Amendment “denied any State the power 
to withhold from [minorities] the equal protection of the laws.”204 Since 
the state clearly denies equal protection when it deliberately excludes 
members of the defendant’s race from the jury, peremptory strikes must 
always be race neutral.205 This freedom from racial discrimination clearly 
lives in the Fourteenth Amendment and is a fundamental component of 
any fair system.206 Thus, to challenge the category of protections 
afforded by this first provision is to challenge the Fourteenth 
Amendment and over 150 years of Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Second, the RJA allows defendants and calls on the courts to look 
beyond the four corners of the case at hand.207 This provision permits 
evidence of pattern and policy that is not directly linked to the case at 
hand to be considered during trial.208 Evidence of patterns, custom, and 
policy are widely used to prove knowledge and intent, yet opponents of 
this practice successfully argued that courts should not be able to 
consider information or actions that do not flow directly out of the case 
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before the court.209 However, the Supreme Court has consistently held 
that courts should look beyond the defendant’s individual case to prevent 
discrimination, especially discriminatory strikes. The Court in Swain 
allowed for a finding of racial discrimination if the defendant could show 
a systemic pattern of strikes against African Americans in the 
prosecutorial district.210 This holding necessarily required looking 
beyond the case at hand and examining the prosecutor’s actions in the 
aggregate.211 In Miller-El, the Court, finding that confining the scope of 
evidence to one’s own case was unduly burdensome and failed to 
adequately guard against acts of discrimination, expressly endorsed 
looking outside the “four corners” of a specific case.212 In fact, the Court 
cast a “wide net” to find evidence of discriminatory patterns and 
practices, including evidence from several years before the defendant’s 
trial persuasive.213 Even though there was no direct evidence that some 
of the actions had any direct effect on the specific trial in Miller-El, the 
Court found the danger of discrimination too great to uphold a capital 
sentence.214 
Finally, the RJA expressly allowed a defendant to prove racial bias 
through statistical evidence from his county, prosecutorial district, or 
state.215 Though this is the most controversial component of the bill, the 
Court has allowed evidence of systemic discrimination to prove racial 
bias since its 1965 decision in Swain.216 Under Swain, a defendant could 
prevail if he showed a systemic pattern of racially motivated strikes by 
the prosecutor in one’s district.217 Batson told the courts to look at “all 
relevant circumstances” and the “totality of relevant facts.”218 The Court 
took pains not to limit the scope of inquiry and provided a “merely 
illustrative” list of relevant considerations. It is hard to imagine that such 
a widely accepted form of evidence would fall outside the parameters of 
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the “totality of relevant facts.”219 Finally, every constitutional right has a 
remedy; the Court has found that indirect evidence is an essential route to 
this remedy. Thus, a statistical evidence provision follows logically; 
statistics are among the most effective and efficient ways to look at a 
large sample of cases and actions.220 
Despite the logical appeal of the constitutional rights argument set 
out above, a full-blown litigation effort has yet to be waged. This 
hesitancy is, in many ways, understandable. Courts have rejected several 
statistic studies. However, a careful reading of these opinions reveals that 
these rulings are less than damning. On the contrary, the Court has only 
rejected studies that did not adequately capture the facts at issue; the 
studies simply did not prove the fact that they set out to prove. For 
instance, the McCleskey study was not rejected because it was a 
statistical study or that it looked at cases outside the case at hand; it was 
rejected because it merely showed a correlation between race and the 
imposition of the death penalty.221 Clearly, the Court was not 
comfortable with overturning a jury verdict based on statistical evidence 
of mere causation alone. However, inferential statistics have made 
significant advancements since that time and are now better able to 
isolate and control for certain variables, creating a strong causation 
argument. In other words, a proper study may be able to control for 
factors, such as “discretion,” which troubled the Court. 
Therefore, the solution advocated by the Article is in some ways 
simple: create better statistical studies. The methodology employed by 
Barbara O’Brien and Catherine M. Grosso represents the type of 
statistical analysis that should be used in any future litigation campaign. 
The study controlled for outliers by analyzing peremptory strikes in 
North Carolina capital cases from 1990 to 2010.  It found that, of the 166 
cases statewide that included at least one black venire member, 
prosecutors struck an average of 56.0% of eligible black venire members, 
compared to only 24.8% of all other eligible venire members.222 More 
importantly, it controlled for the other race-neutral reasons cited by 
prosecutors, including death penalty views, criminal backgrounds, 
employment, marital status, and hardship.223 From this data, the trial 
court was able to undertake a meaningful examination of not only the 
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correlation between race and strikes, but also whether it was race and not 
some other reason that caused it. Additional studies should also borrow 
from the methodology used in the McCleskey study. Evidence of 
racially-biased strikes, coupled with racially-influenced outcomes, 
creates, to borrow a term from Title VII jurisprudence, a more 
“convincing mosaic” of decimation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Racial discrimination is a tragic but very real part of our past and our 
present. The Racial Justice Act attempted to keep it from being part of 
our future. It ensured that each person was afforded equal treatment 
under the law. It ensured that punishment was more commensurate with 
the crime and not affected by his race. It ensured that our criminal system 
was seen as more legitimate, fair, and impartial. However, despite its 
lofty goals, the RJA was not without precedent. Indeed, it embodied the 
protections that live in the Fourteenth Amendment224 and are found in 
cases from Brown to Batson: Each citizen must be afforded equal 
protection of the law regardless of his or her race. To this end, the Court 
has required states to follow such prohibitions on racially motivated jury 
selection similar to that in the RJA since Strauder in 1880. More recent 
jurisprudence only confirms this statement. 
The RJA’s statistical tools are not without precedent either. On the 
contrary, the Court has accepted statistical analysis in Title VII and 
venire-selection cases in the past. It has accepted proof of systemic 
patterns of discrimination in a district. It has called on courts to look 
beyond the “four corners” of a case and at the “totality of relevant facts.” 
It has accepted these showings to give effect to the promise of equal 
protection. 
The evidentiary safeguards in the RJA followed Supreme Court 
precedent and are essential to enforcing a defendant’s right to equal 
protection. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that all people will 
receive equal protection of the law. In order for this right to have any 
significance, defendants must be able to enforce this right in court and 
enforce it effectively. Essential to this enforcement is the ability to prove 
violations when they occur. The Court in Miller-El has recognized that 
confining the racial bias inquiry to the “four corners” of a defendant’s 
case is unduly burdensome and constrains the defendant from enforcing 
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this right.225 Given the broad array of acceptable reasons for peremptory 
strikes, prosecutors can often defeat a meritorious Batson challenge on a 
case-by-case. Therefore, it might only be by looking at a large group of 
cases that show a clear and consistent pattern of strikes against blacks 
that the defendant can overcome these explanations and prove racial bias. 
Since the Fourteenth Amendment is principally concerned with 
preventing racial discrimination, it must give defendants this right to 
look outside their own case to prove racial bias. 
This jurisprudence has to include the use of statistics. If defendants 
are allowed to look at evidence of pattern and practice outside of their 
own case to create a presumption of racial bias, it follows that defendants 
need to have an effective way of compiling, examining, and showing this 
data. Statistical analysis is arguably the best way to look at large amounts 
of data and come to a conclusion from that data. Furthermore, statistics 
are commonly used in many other legal contexts and there is no clear 
reason why jury selection in the capital punishment context should be 
any different. 
The Racial Justice Act was heralded, and rightly so, as a profound 
step towards securing racial equality in sentencing and punishment. 
However, these steps are made pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment 
and Supreme Court precedent and secure essential evidentiary rights for 
all defendants. Any attempt by the state to frustrate the achievement of 
such equality, must be seen as an unconstitutional attempt by the states to 
limit the efficacy of the Fourteenth Amendment. Given the repugnant 
nature of racial discrimination and the difficulty of proving it without the 
help of statistics, legislatures cannot shrink the wide net that the Supreme 
Court demands.226 Accordingly, advocates should continue presenting 
statistical evidence of discrimination, even after the RJA’s repeal and 
McCleskey’s frustrating holding. 
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